The Reluctant Atlanticist:France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context by Schmitt, Olivier
Syddansk Universitet











Citation for pulished version (APA):
Schmitt, O. (2017). The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context.
The Journal of Strategic Studies. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1220367
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Apr. 2017
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20
Download by: [University of Southern Denmark], [Lone S. Madsen] Date: 05 December 2016, At: 23:48
Journal of Strategic Studies
ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20
The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and
Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context
Olivier Schmitt
To cite this article: Olivier Schmitt (2016): The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security
and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI:
10.1080/01402390.2016.1220367
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1220367
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 24 Aug 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 488
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and
Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context
Olivier Schmitt
Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark (SDU), Denmark
ABSTRACT
This article introduces the key tenets of French foreign and security policy
during the Cold War, and illustrates the deep challenges to the French
consensus raised by the emergence of a unipolar system. There is a growing
gap between the rhetoric of French security policy, emphasizing ‘autonomy’
and ‘sovereignty’ out of habit from the Cold War, and the actual security
practices showing a gradual embedding within the transatlantic security
structures. In the absence of a new transpartisan grand narrative relevant
for the contemporary international system, such embedding is easily por-
trayed in France as a ‘treason’ from a romanticized Gaullist foreign policy.
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‘Vive la France!’ tweeted US Senator John McCain, after Paris tried (unsuccess-
fully in the end) to imposemore restraining conditions on the deal between the
world’s leading powers and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear development pro-
gramme. ‘Thank God for France,’ added Senator Lindsey Graham. The contrast
with the way US oﬃcials (particularly from the Republican Party) used to
mention France in the previous decade could not be stronger. Gone is the
‘Freedom Fries’ era when Condoleezza Rice wanted to ‘punish France’ for
opposing the invasion of Iraq out of (justiﬁed, as it turned out) concerns that
it would durably destabilize the Middle East, and former undersecretary of
defense Jed Babbin (MSNBC’s ‘Hardball’, 30 January 2003) could declare:
‘going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion.
You just leave a lot of useless noisy baggage behind’. Nowadays, US think-tanks
praise the French armed forces for their quick and eﬀective action in Mali1 and
France’s ﬁght against jihadist movements;2 soldiers from the US Marine Corps
openly express their admiration for the ﬁghting spirit, tactical skills and
CONTACT Olivier Schmitt schmitt@sam.sdu.dk
1Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali. Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation 2014).
2Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’Ida in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2015).
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preparedness of French soldiers;3 and a Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ
forges an ‘unmistakable bond’ with his French counterpart.4
But American policy-makers have not simply changed their perception
of French security policy. France actually seems to become closer to the
United States. First, France re-joined NATO’s integrated command struc-
ture in 2008, in a move designed to raise its inﬂuence within the alliance
but also overcome an old source of transatlantic tension.5 Second,
President Nicolas Sarkozy decided to signiﬁcantly increase the French
contribution to the International Security and Assistance (ISAF) mission
in Afghanistan,6 a choice that was well perceived by the United States.
Third, as mentioned above, French military activities in the Sahel against
jihadist groups as well as the participation in the US-led coalition against
ISIS in Iraq and in Syria further improved France’s image in the United
States. To be fair, even at the worst time of the Franco-American crisis
following the French government’s opposition to the Iraq War, coopera-
tion in the ﬁeld of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy always remained
strong. But it is clear that something is qualitatively changing in the way
France is becoming integrated within the transatlantic security structure.
In order to appreciate the magnitude of this change, some historical
context is necessary.
The French Exception in the Transatlantic Security Order
In 1958, when Charles de Gaulle came to power, he found France embroiled
in the Algerian conﬂict, and already increasingly concerned about military
developments within NATO, which were perceived as threatening France’s
autonomy.7 His foreign policy has fascinated French and international his-
torians alike,8 and was a subject of simultaneous irritation and interest from
France’s partners at the time. French historian Maurice Vaïsse found a very
eﬀective way of summarizing de Gaulle’s foreign policy with the term
‘grandeur’ (greatness):9 de Gaulle had a grand strategic design, and a
means to achieve it. The grand strategic design was to ensure the return
3Chris Hernandez, ‘Working with the French Army’, BreachBangClear.com, 9 July 2013.
4Anon., ‘France Displaces Britain as Key US Military Ally’, Agence France Presse, 19 March 2015.
5Annick Cizel and Stéfanie von Hlatky, ‘From Exceptional to Special? A Reassessment of France-NATO
Relations since Reintegration’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 12/4 (2014), 353–66.
6David Auerswald and Steven Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2014).
7Jenny Raﬂik-Grenouilleau La IVe République et l’Alliance Atlantique. Inﬂuence et Dépendance (1945-
1958), (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes 2013).
8Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher and Garret Martin (eds.), Globalizing de Gaulle. International perspec-
tives on French Foreign Policy 1958-1969 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010); Benjamin Rowland (ed.),
Charles de Gaulle’s Legacy of Ideas (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); Sudhir Hazareesingh, In the
Shadow of the General: Modern France and the Myth of de Gaulle (Oxford: Oxford UP 2012).
9Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur. Politique Etrangère du Général de Gaulle (Paris: Fayard 1998).
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of France’s presence everywhere in the world, create an autonomous Europe
open to Africa, decrease the tensions with the Eastern bloc and establish
relations with China. The intellectual cornerstone of this grand strategic
design was a cult of sovereignty for its own sake,10 found among other
Western states (for example the UK), but with a speciﬁc Gallic turn. In France,
the intellectual defence of sovereignty has been intertwined with the spe-
ciﬁc centralized form taken by the State11 and the importance of the
Executive branch in public aﬀairs.12 De Gaulle’s defence of sovereignty
also had a more personal dimension: owing much of its intellectual educa-
tion to Charles Maurras’ Action Française,13 de Gaulle had been inﬂuenced
by the doctrine of nationalisme intégral which was based on the defence of
French sovereignty, but also by Maurras’ foreign policy ideas of an indepen-
dent France leading the small nations against the empires.14 Moreover, de
Gaulle still resented the American attempt to place France under the Allied
Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT) system in 1944.15
The means to achieve the grand strategic objective was to claim vocally
France’s ‘autonomy’ on every single occasion, and give his country the
capabilities to implement and defend this autonomy. The means (auton-
omy) is often confused with the end (grand strategy) in the assessment of
de Gaulle’s foreign policy, as the former is more visible (and easily critici-
sable) than the latter. Yet, distinguishing both is analytically useful: ‘auton-
omy’ was never an objective per se, it was a means to accomplish a foreign
policy aimed at overcoming the bipolarity of the Cold War, and the some-
how mechanical polarization of alliances that came with it. This foreign
objective was, with some minor adjustments, adopted by de Gaulle’s suc-
cessors during the Cold War.16 As such, the French exceptionalism can be
understood as the combination of an ambitious grand strategy and the
means to implement it through a policy of autonomy.
One of the important means at de Gaulle and his successors’ disposal, in
order to achieve their foreign policy objective, was the development of an
independent French nuclear deterrent capability. Marked by the outcome of
the Suez crisis, in which France and the UK were coerced to leave Egypt by
10Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1999).
11Pierre Rosanvallon, L’État en France de 1789 à nos Jours (Paris: Seuil 1990); Simone Goyard-Fabre,
L’État (Paris: Armand Colin 1999); Jean Picq, Une Histoire de l’État en Europe. Pouvoir, Justice et Droit
du Moyen Âge à nos Jours (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po 2009).
12Nicolas Rousselier, La Force de Gouverner. Le Pouvoir Exécutif en France, XIXe-XXIe Siècles (Paris:
Gallimard 2015).
13Eugen Weber, Action Française; Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford
UP 1962); Jacques Prévotat, L’Action Française (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2004); Olivier
Dard, Charles Maurras, Le Maître et l’Action (Paris: Armand Colin 2013).
14Georges-Henri Soutou and Martin Motte (eds.), Entre la Vieille Europe et la Seule France. Charles
Maurras, La Politique Extérieure et la Défense Nationale (Paris: Economica 2009).
15Jean-François Muracciole, La Libération de Paris (Paris: Tallandier 2013), 59–74.
16Maurice Vaïsse, La Puissance ou l’Inﬂuence? La France dans le Monde depuis 1958 (Paris: Fayard 2009);
Frédéric Bozo, La Politique Étrangère de la France depuis 1945 (Paris: Flammarion 2012).
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the USSR and the US, de Gaulle accelerated the nuclear programme initiated
by the Fourth Republic with the aim of guaranteeing France’s freedom of
manoeuver in relation to the two superpowers.17 This period was marked by
an intense debate in France regarding the proper nuclear strategy to adopt,
which opposed the ‘atlanticists’ and the ‘sovereignists’. The ﬁrst group, led
by Raymond Aron and General Beaufre, contended that the French nuclear
deterrent should be aimed at reinforcing the American deterrence capabil-
ities, similarly to the British model.18 While France could be in competition
with some allies on a number of issues, competition should not be confused
with hostility: the enemy was to the East. The second group, which com-
prised famous oﬃcers such as Generals Gallois and Poirier, advocated that
the French nuclear deterrent should not be targeted at any enemy in
particular: deterrence cannot be shared, so there should be no reason to
subordinate the French capability to the American one. Because this strate-
gic conception dovetailed neatly with de Gaulle’s foreign policy objective, it
eventually won the strategic debate and was adopted as the French nuclear
strategy. Furthermore, this nuclearization of French defence policy also had
a consequence on the political regime itself by cementing the role of the
French president. Because he commands the nuclear forces, the French
president is, literally, the embodiment of French deterrence, which further
reinforces the presidential nature of the Fifth Republic. It is no surprise that
the French regime has been called a ‘nuclear monarchy’.19
Another way to implement the goal of autonomy was to withdraw the
French armed forces from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966.
This decision was the culmination of a gradual French disaﬀection towards
NATO, and in particular the Anglo-American primacy in the alliance.20 Of
course, the French armed forces were never entirely disconnected from
NATO’s defence planning process during the Cold War, as Memoranda of
Understanding were agreed upon between French head of staﬀs and
SACEURs.21 However, this situation had two consequences. First, during
the Cold War, the French armed forces were never as integrated as their
European counterparts in terms of procedures or equipment. Therefore, the
French armed forces lacked suﬃcient knowledge about the proper NATO
17Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1971); André
Dumoulin, Histoire de la Dissuasion Nucléaire (Paris: Argos 2012); Édouard Valensi, La Dissuasion
Nucléaire. L’Aventure Nucléaire Française: les Ergots du Coq (Paris: L’Harmattan 2013); Jean Guisnel and
Bruno Tertrais, Le Président et la Bombe (Paris: Odile Jacob 2016).
18Christian Malis, Raymond Aron et le Débat Stratégique Français (1930-1966) (Paris: Economica 2005).
19Samy Cohen, La Monarchie Nucléaire (Paris: Hachette 1986).
20Frédéric Bozo, La France et l’OTAN. De la Guerre Froide au Nouvel Ordre Européen (Paris: IFRI 1992);
Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri et Frédéric Bozo (eds.), La France et l’OTAN, 1949-1996 (Bruxelles:
Complexes 1997); Charles G. Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO – Then
and Now (Westport: Praeger 1997).
21Sten Rynning, Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958-
2000 (Westport: Praeger 2002).
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procedures, which had consequences during the NATO-led operations to
which France participated, including Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Even
after France had reintegrated the military structure, such a lack of knowl-
edge played out during the Libyan intervention: several policymakers
expressed their frustration for not having been able to suﬃciently shape
the conduct of the campaign, due to a relative lack of understanding of the
importance of speciﬁc positions within the NATO structure.22 In particular,
French oﬃcials complained about their lack of inﬂuence on the targeting
process, due to their relative absence from the Joint Targeting Board but
also lamented the fact that they had to convince NATO of the need to have
the French helicopter pilots deciding which targets to attack. Therefore, the
auto-exclusion of the French armed forces from NATO procedures created
an integration gap that is still being ﬁlled today. Second, this desire to
maintain a French strategic autonomy was also exerted in the former
French colonies, with a number of interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (but
also Lebanon) during the Cold War. This policy created a two-tier army: an
army designed for high-intensity warfare against the Soviet Union, which
was never used, and an army designed for quick interventions in Africa built
on elite light infantry forces such as the paratroopers and the Foreign
Legion. These dual armed forces proved their limitation during the Gulf
War, as France struggled to mobilize and deploy 15,000 troops, which were
deemed too lightly equipped by the American planners: the French tradition
of agility and quick reaction, acquired through several military interventions,
lacked suﬃcient armour to participate in General Schwartzkopf’s
manoeuver.23 To an important degree, the French ‘way of warfare’ during
the Cold War was somehow marginalized, with part of the army designed to
ﬁght the Soviet Union incompletely integrated with other NATO armies; and
another part specializing in light interventions but lacking experience with
high intensity operations.24
As explained above, the French strategic debate has historically been
split between ‘atlanticists’ and ‘sovereignists’, with the latter group gaining
primacy through the primary importance acquired by the nuclear deter-
rence capability within the French armed forces, and maintaining this posi-
tion during the Cold War. However, the former group, which considered that
France was an integral member of the Atlantic family, never really disap-
peared, although it was deﬁnitely less important in the French decision-
making process and less active in the production of a strategic literature.
Yet, this dichotomy was also rhetorically manipulated in order to favour the
22Olivier Schmitt, ‘A War Worth Fighting? The Libyan Intervention in Retrospect’, International Politics
Reviews, 3/1 (2015), 10–18.
23David S. Yost, ‘France and the Gulf War of 1990-1991: Political-Military Lessons Learned’, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 16/3 (1993), 339–74.
24David S. Yost, La France et la Sécurité Européenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).
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sovereignists’ political preferences. As such, ‘atlanticist’ became an insult in
the French political debate, with self-proclaimed heirs to the Gaullist legacy
trying to block any political-diplomatic evolution that would seem to threa-
ten France’s sovereignty. Therefore, this inﬂammatory rhetoric about the
‘sovereignty’ (and associated terms such as ‘independence’, or ‘autonomy’)
went beyond what France was actually doing, and overlooked the actual
steps Paris took towards the allies during the Cold War. Moreover, this also
gave the impression to foreign non-specialist observers that France was
always more a problem than a reliable partner in the transatlantic security
architecture.25 This is not to underplay the fact that France was, indeed,
something of an outsider during the Cold War. But there is the risk of
focusing too much on the rhetoric of ‘sovereignty’, thus overlooking both
the foreign policy objectives this independence was designed to serve, and
the cooperation France achieved with her allies.
Ultimately, France was quite comfortable with the bipolar world, as the
opposition between the US and the USSR meant that there was room for an
ambitious actor to try to ﬁnd a third way beyond the bipolarization of the
international system. It also meant that France could develop genuinely
autonomous ways to act abroad, in particular through military interventions
in former colonies and the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. This allowed
France to keep behaving as a great power, by adopting practices (in
particular nuclear practices) similar to those of the major powers,26 thus
mitigating the objective loss of geopolitical importance that France suﬀered
after the Second World War.27 Yet, this situation would change with the end
of the Cold War and the apparition of the unipolar world: French exception-
alism would have to reinvent itself.
French Exceptionalism after the Cold War
The transformation of the international system that followed the end of the
Cold War put French foreign and security policy under pressure. The French
exceptionalism was based on the willingness to ﬁnd a ‘third way’ between
the two blocs. With the rise of unipolarity,28 this fundamental premise
disappeared. Therefore, a progressive gap was created between France’s
foreign policy objectives, which had to be redeﬁned, and the rhetoric and
25Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press
1981).
26On diplomatic practices and their ranking eﬀect, see Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B.
Neumann (eds.), Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2015) and
Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2016).
27Olivier Schmitt, ‘Decline in Denial. France since 1945’ in Frédéric Mérand (ed.), Coping with
Geopolitical Decline (forthcoming).
28Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wholforth, World out of Balance: International Relations and the
Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2008); Nuno S. Monteiro, Theory of
Unipolar Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2013).
6 O. SCHMITT
practice of independence, which was still implemented by French decision-
makers out of habit and experience. Unsurprisingly, French policy-makers
were uncomfortable with the new international order, complaining of the
‘hyperpower’29 of the United States, and calling on multiple occasions for
the emergence of a ‘multipolar world’. In their mind, this meant that Europe
would become more independent from the United States, in eﬀect a simple
update of the autonomy objective inherited from the Cold War, without
realizing that a ‘multipolar world’ could mean that actors such as Russia or
China may want to challenge the international order. In other words, French
decision-makers simply updated the rhetorical means to achieve France’s
Cold War foreign policy objective (adding ‘multipolarity’ to the traditional
call for independence), which prevented the emergence of deep thinking
about the transformation of the international system and the consequences
for French foreign policy.30 In short, after the Cold War, France confused the
means with the ends, and was subjugated by the former without re-thinking
the core assumptions of the latter.
Yet, much had to be done. The unipolar world order meant that in one
way or another, France had to reinvent its relationship with the United
States, as it could not manoeuver between two blocs of equivalent power
any longer. It also meant that France’s relationship with NATO had to be
reconsidered, taking into account the alliance’s new roles after the Cold
War.31 Characteristically, important parts of the French strategic community
pushed for the dissolution of NATO after 1991 and immediately saw the USA
as a new ‘Empire’ (heir to the old arch-enemy that was the Holy Roman
Empire)32 which had to be tamed. As such, authors reactivated the old
Gaullist distinction between the Atlantic Alliance (which could be main-
tained), and NATO as an organization (which could disappear in order to
leave room for a European defence).33 For more than a decade, French
policy-makers hoped for the establishment of a ‘European defence’ which
would, depending on the moment, be a European pillar within NATO or a
fully autonomous capacity that would make NATO obsolete. It is only
recently that France acknowledged that ‘European Defence’ as initially
29Hubert Védrine, Face à l’Hyperpuissance (Paris: Fayard 2003).
30Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton UP 1993); Beatrice Heuser, ‘Mitterrand’s Gaullism: Cold War Policies for the Post-Cold War
World?’ in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Europe 1945-1990: the End of an Era? (New York: St. Martin’s Press
1994), 346–69; Jolyon Howorth, ‘Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security
and Defence Policy’, West European Politics, 27/2 (2004) 211–34.
31Rebecca S. Moore, NATO’s New Mission. Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World (Westport:
Praeger 2007).
32Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan 1998), 139–42
33Bozo, La France et l’OTAN; Shaun Gregory, French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2000); Maurice Vaïsse, ‘La France et l’OTAN: une Histoire’,
Politique Étrangère, 4 (2009), 861–72.
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conceived was more an ideal than an achievable goal, and that smaller steps
had to be envisioned instead.34
Also, with multinational interventions becoming the new trend for Western
states through a combination of normative pressures towards multilateralism
and budgetary constraints,35 the French armed forces had to learn how to
cooperate with their partners, which highlighted the diﬀerences in strategic
cultures,36 the possibility of reform,37 but also the potential for convergence
with the armed forces of like-minded countries.38 The nuclear order was also
challenged, with new actors threatening traditional deterrence from the out-
side (by developing new capabilities including nuclear capabilities in some
cases), or from below (by conducting actions below the threshold of triggering
nuclear reactions).39 Yet, despite the amplitude of the transformation of the
international system, the seduction of ‘autonomy’ as an objective per se means
that any change in the French security policy is judged according to the
threshold of a romanticized Gaullism, which serves as a rhetorical resource
to shame policies actors disagree with. This exercise is evenly spread on all
sides of the political spectrum, thus validating de Gaulle’s ironic formulation
when he forecast that his legacy would be disputed by all political groups:
‘everyone has been, is, or will be a Gaullist’. Currently, the new trend in French
circles is to call Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande’s foreign policies ‘neo-
conservative’ (in opposition to the ‘Gaullo-Mitterandists’) because of their
alleged militarism, although French military interventions abroad are numeri-
cally on decline compared with François Mitterrand or Jacques Chirac’s terms
in oﬃce.
Yet, a growing gap between the practice and the rhetoric of French security
policy is observable, which leads observers to question the eﬀectiveness of
French diplomacy.40 The constant reference to the French Cold War foreign
and security policy, and subsequent shaming of any departure from it, is easily
34Anan Menon, ‘La Politique de Défense Européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne. Beaucoup de Bruit
pour Rien’, Politique Étrangère 2 (2011), 375–87; Stefanie Hofmann, European Security in NATO’s
Shadow. Party Ideologies and Institution Building (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2013); Nicole Gnesotto,
Faut-il Enterrer la Défense Européenne? (Paris: La Documentation Française 2014); Vivien Pertusot,
‘Défense Européenne: Enﬁn du Renouveau’, Politique Étrangère, 1 (2015), 11–23.
35Sarah Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford:
Oxford UP 2011); Patricia E. Weitsman, Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions and Institutions of Interstate
Violence (Palo Alto: Stanford UP 2013); Olivier Schmitt, Allies that Count. Junior Partners in Coalition
Warfare after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP, forthcoming in 2017).
36Bastien Irondelle and Olivier Schmitt, ‘France’, in Giegerich, Bastian, Heiko Biehl and Alexandra Jonas
(eds.): Strategic Cultures in Europe (Munich: VS Verlag 2013), 125–38.
37Terry Terriﬀ, ‘NATO Military Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities for France’, European
Security 19/1 (2010), 61–78.
38Alice Pannier and Olivier Schmitt, ‘Institutionalised Cooperation and Policy Convergence in European
Defence: Lessons from the Relations between France, Germany and the United Kingdom’, European
Security, 23/3 (2014), 270–89.
39Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century. Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of
Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation 2012).
40Frédéric Charillon, La France peut-elle encore Agir sur le Monde? (Paris: Armand Colin 2010).
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explainable by the absence of a new transpartisan grand narrative relevant for
the contemporary international system, but overlooks the actual security
policy changes France went through since the end of the Cold War and
which are covered in this special issue. The ﬁrst two articles explore France’s
integration within the transatlantic security landscape. Alice Pannier argues
that Paris’ relation with London and Washington has been profoundly trans-
formed since the end of the Cold War, with France embracing in practice, if not
in rhetoric, its integration within the western ‘family’. Stephanie Hofmann
shows that the ‘Gaullist consensus’ on NATO was not as widely shared as
commonly thought and that party preferences matter in order to understand
France’s NATO policy, thus adding a welcome degree of granularity in the
study of this troubled relationship. The second pair of articles explores core
issues of sovereignty: nuclear strategy and intelligence. Nicolas Giacometti
shows that the French, British and American nuclear doctrines have actually
converged and that the diﬀerences are much less acute than during the Cold
War. Olivier Chopin links the evolution of the French intelligence laws with a
radical transformation of the nature of the French polity, which is gradually
moving from a centralized state-based system to a more traditional liberal
model. This deep transformation of the French state explains a gradually
evolving relationship with the way intelligence is conceived in the decision-
making process, and thus the organization of intelligence agencies. Finally, the
last two articles look at France at war, in order to dispel a number of common
myths. Elie Tenenbaum shows that the development of a counter-insurgency
doctrine in France, the UK and the US has very much been the result of a
transatlantic circulation of knowledge since the end of the Second World War,
and that the COIN communities of the three countries have always been
integrated. Olivier Schmitt introduces the concept of ‘selective emulation’ in
order to explain the French military change in Afghanistan, in particular
through the observation of allies’ best practices.
Overall, the contributions to this special issue shed a new light on
France’s security policies, as they provide empirical analyses of France’s
security practices without taking for granted the self-referential discourse
of ‘exceptionality’ that too often serves as the starting point for analysis. It is
time for such a dispassionate assessment, which shall be beneﬁcial for
France and her allies alike. Reluctant as she can sometimes be, France is
an active member of the transatlantic security family.
Notes on contributor
Olivier Schmitt is an Associate Professor of political science at the Center for War
Studies, University of Southern Denmark (SDU), Denmark.
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